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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FREAL STRATTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
IRA NIELSEN d/b/a J & I
TRUCKING CO., and
SHERMAN KAY CHRISTENSEN,

Case No.

12031

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff, a truck driver working for Vegas Village,
brought suit against defendants for personal injuries sustained in a two-truck collision which occurred near Baker,
California. The issues of defendants' negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence were submitted to the jury,
which returned a verdict of no cause of action.
Defendants do not adopt the statement of facts set
forth in plaintiff's brief. The following statement of facts
views the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendants.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 28, 1963, Sherman Kay Christensen ( hereinafter referred to as "Christensen") and Kent Johnson, two
truck drivers employed by Ira Nielsen d/b/a J & I Trucking
Company (hereinafter referred to as "Nielsen"), left Salina,
Utah in Nielsen's semi truck and trailer loaded with 35 head
of cattle en route to Los Angeles, California (Tr. 0148 0149). Christensen had driven trucks while working for a
turkey plant in Salina, Utah, and while he was in the Air
Force (Tr. 0172 - 0173). He worked for Nielsen about three
months before the accident (Tr. 0145). Kent Johnson drove
to Las Vegas, Nevada, then crawled in the sleeper and
Christensen began to drive (Tr. 0151). He drove on U.S.
Highway 91 (Interstate 15) to the Baker summit in California where he stopped to check the tires and the load (Tr.
0154). It was night time when they stopped on the Baker
summit. While Christensen was stopped on the Baker summit, the plaintiff, driving an empty semi truck and trailer
en route to Los Angeles, California, passed the Nielsen
truck (Tr. 0198). Christensen then started driving the truck
down the 18 mile grade into Baker, California (Tr. 0152).
He had the truck geared down for the grade (Tr. 0179).
There were two lanes for traffic going west toward Baker
and two lanes for traffic going east toward Las Vegas
(Tr. 0155). As Christensen came down the grade, he was
traveling approximately 35 to 40 mph (Tr. 0161). When he
was approximately five miles east of Baker, he saw two
semi trucks ahead of him in the right lane heading west
toward Baker (Tr. 0157). These two trucks were about a
mile ahead of Christensen when he first saw them (Tr.
0158). As Christensen approached the trucks he smelled
fumes from hot brakes and observed that the first truck
was going slower than the truck behind it (Tr. 0158). The
lead truck was later identified as being owned by "Little
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Audrey" and the second truck was the Vegas Village truck
driven by the plaintiff (Tr. 0158). Christensen assumed
that it was the lead vehicle's brakes that he smelled (Tr.
0158). As the three trucks continued on down the grade,
the plaintiff drove his truck into the left lane and slowed
down parallel to the Little Audrey truck (Tr. 0158). Christensen could not recall if the plaintiff signalled when he
turned out to go around the Little Audrey truck (Tr. 0159).
Christensen was about five or six hundred yards behind the
two trucks when the plaintiff drove into the left lane (Tr.
0158). Christensen observed that the brakes on the Little
Audrey truck were sparking and flashing (Tr. 0161). Christensen saw the brake lights come on the truck driven by the
plaintiff as it paralleled the Little Audrey truck (Tr. 0159).
Christensen was still in the right lane when he made these
observations (Tr. 0162). He started slowing his vehicle
down to allow the plaintiff time to roll down his window
and tell the driver of the Little Audrey truck that his brakes
were flashing and sparking (Tr. 0162). Christensen then
turned into the left lane to follow the plaintiff around the
Little Audrey truck (Tr. 0163).
While Christensen continued down the grade in the
left lane, the plaintiff did not pass the Little Audrey truck
but remained parallel to it so both lanes of the highway
were blocked (Tr. 0163). Christensen testified:
"Well, I see (sic) that as I got closer he continued
to stay along side the other vehicle, so I hit my air horn and
flashed my lights and he stayed there and I hit my air horn
again and I had both feet on the brakes from then on until
the impact."

Christensen sounded his air horn twice and flashed his
lights once before the impact occurred (Tr. 0176). Christensen testified that if he had driven to the left side of the
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highway into the drainage median he stood a good chance
of tipping over (Tr. 0187).
The plaintiff testified that he saw the truck
driven by Christensen coming down the highway behind
him (Tr. 0202). Although he saw the truck coming "real
fast" he still put on his brakes and slowed down (Tr. 02010202). Christensen thought the Vegas Village and Little
Audrey trucks were side by side for a minute or two (Tr.
0166).
The truck driven by Christensen collided with the rear
of the truck driven by the plaintiff (Tr. 0167). After the
impact, the truck driven by the plaintiff passed the Little
Audrey truck and then went off into the desert on the north
side of the road (Tr. 0168). The truck driven by Christensen
also passed the Little Audrey truck and went out into the
desert on the north side of the road (Tr. 0168).
Christensen testified that his truck was travelling at
about 30 mph. at the time of impact (Tr. 0175) . He thought
the plaintiff's truck was going 25 mph. at the time of impact
(Tr. 0175). On direct examination, plaintiff testified he was
going 15 to 20 mph. when he was alongside the "Little
Audrey" truck (Tr. 0213). On cross examination the plaintiff admitted that he braked down to 25 to 28 mph. as he
drove alongside the Little Audrey truck (Tr. 0279). Following the accident, the tractor driven by the plaintiff was
attached to the Nielsen trailer and driven to Los Angeles
by the plaintiff and Kent Johnson (Tr. 0217). The plaintiff
was not hospitalized after the accident (Tr. 0282).
Approximately two months after the accident, the
plaintiff was involved in another accident when a truck in
which he was riding turned over (Tr. 0245).
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The plaintiff did not make a motion for a directed
verdict. The issues of negligence and contributory negligence were submitted to the jury. A unanimous verdict of
no cause of action was returned by the jury (Tr. 0060).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

Plaintiff made no request for a directed verdict.
After the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action,
plaintiff made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

Defendant contends that plaintiff's failure to move for
a directed verdict is a procedural deficiency which precludes
this court from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict.
In the recent case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric
Co. filed June 8, 1970 (not reported as of the date of printing
defendant's brief) this court cited with approval the case of
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 427 P.2d 278 (Idaho 1967),
where the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the failure
of a defendant to present to the District Court a motion for
a directed verdict not only foreclosed the District Court
from consideration of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but precluded the Supreme Court from
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
In the Christensen case, supra, the plaintiff injured her
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back when she attempted to help a waitress who started to
sink to the floor while carrying several plates of dinners.
At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a
dismissal of the action on the ground there was no proof
of negligence. The trial court denied the motion and the
defendant proceeded with the presentation of his evidence.
At the conclusion of all the evidence no motion was made by
defendant for a directed verdict. After the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the
motion pointing out that no motion had been made for a
directed verdict.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed stating:
"When appellant at the close of the presentation
of all the evidence failed to renew his motion for a
directed verdict under IRCP 50 (a), the trial court was
foreclosed from consideration of his later motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because under
the provisions of IRCP 50 (b) it is a prerequisite for

consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that a prior motion for directed verdict
be made and denied. 5 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed.

Par. 50.08, p. 2357; 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition §1077, p. 406."
(emphasis added)
The court further stated :

The failure of the appellant here to present to the trial
court a motion for directed verdict not only foreclosed
the trial court from consideration of his motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but under deci-

sions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
such failure precludes the appellate court from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict." (emphasis added)
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Rule 50 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is
substantially the same as Rule 50 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
"(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. Whenever a
motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all
the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted,
the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal
questions raised by the motion. Within 10 days after
the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a
directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such
party, within 10 days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict. * * * " (emphasis
added)
The Utah Rule requires as a prerequisite for consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
that a prior motion for a directed verdict be made and
denied.
The reason for the rule is well explained in 5 Moores
Federal Practice, Par. 50.05 [l], p. 2343, which states:
"From the beginning of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the courts have been consistent in holding
that the appellate court cannot review the sufficiency
of the evidence in the absence of an unwaived motion
for a directed verdict. Essentially, the reasons behind
this position are two. The first is the general rule that
an appellate court will not review issues on appeal that
were not properly raised in the trial court. The second
is that the function of the appellate court is to review
actions of the trial court; it does not and cannot sit to
review the actions of the jury itself. The latter proposi-
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tion rests on a constitutional base that precludes the
reconsideration of verdicts by an appellate tribunal."
In Lektol,a v. Brown Nevada Corporation, 412 P.2d 972
'(Nevada 1,966'), the Supreme Court of Nevada reinstated a
jury verdict for plaintiffs after the trial court had granted
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The Nevada Supreme Court stated:

"* * * A 50 (a) motion must be made at the close of

all the evidence if the movant wishes later to make a
postverdict motion under that rule. Such, we think, is
the fair intendment .of Rule 50, the necessary implica,,...
ti on of Sobrio v. Ca;fferata, supra, and the holding of
many cases collected in 69 A.L.R. 2d 449 at 478 and 97
L.Ed. 90. A 41 (b) mid-trial motion necessarily tests the
evidence as it then exists. Here the court reserved
ruling on that motion. Thereafter, the complexion of
the case changed as the defendant offered evidence.
The record does not show that at the close of the case
the defendant requested a ruling on the mid-trial motion, 6551 Collins Avenue Cop. v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337
(Fla. 1958), and no motion was made for a directed
verdict. Nothing oceurred. The lower court, therefore,
was not authorized to entertain a postverdict motion
under 50 ( b) ". (emphasis added)
Rule 50(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is
also substantially the same as Rule 50 (b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Even if the plaintiff had moved for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence to correct the procedural
deficiency, there was substantial evidence on the issue of
negligence and contributory negligence to be resolved by the
jury.
Reasonable men could find that the plaintiff drove
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alongside the Little Audrey truck and slowed down when
he knew there was a loaded cattle truck approachfog "real
fast" (Tr. 0202). Christensen testified the plaintiff was
parallel with the Little Audrey truckfor·bne or two minutes
so the freeway for westbound traffic
completely blooked
(Tr. 0166). Reasonable men could also find that Christensen
was not negligent as he could assume the plaintiff would
drive around the Little Audrey truck and not block the freeway. Christensen did slow down, ·sound his air horn twice
and flash his lights once. Reasonable men could conclude
he did everything he could to avoid the accident.
If different conclusions can be drawn from the evidence

a motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
The failure of the trial court to give plaintiff's requested instruction number one was not prejudicial error
because it was merely a statement of the claims of the
parties. After the statement from the trial court at the
beginning of the trial regarding the nature of the case,
opening statements made by counsel for plaintiff and counsel
for defendants and two days of testimony regarding the
accident, the jury obviously was aware of the claims of the
parties.
This type of a statement is nearly always made at the
beginning of the trial to advise the prospective jurors of
the nature of the ease so they can state if they have heard
anything about the suit. The court did advise the jury of
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the nature of this case in his opening comments and counsel
for both parties made a complete opening statement informing the jury of the proposed evidence and the issues
involved. In this case there were only two parties-plaintiff
and defendants-and there were only two issues-negligence and contributory negligence-so a restatement of who
the parties were and their claims was not necessary. If the
trial court was of the opinion that the jury knew who the
parties were and the nature of their claims, it was clearly
not prejudicial error to refuse Instruction No. 1.
The opening instruction given by the Court was as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
"It is the duty of the Court to instruct you as to
the law pertaining to this case and it will be your duty
to accept and follow the instructions of the court as to
the law, regardless of what you personally believe the
law is or is or (sic) ought to be. You should refer to
these instructions in connection with any question or
problem as to the law which may arise during your
discussion in the jury room."
Instructions No. 6 and 8 requested by plaintiff were
substantially the same instruction.
The subject matter of these instructions was covered
by the court's instructions No. 4 and 5:
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
"It is the duty of every driver to use reasonable
care under the circumstances in driving his car to avoid
danger to himself and others and to observe and be
aware of the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other existing conditions; in that regard, he is
obliged to observe due care in respect to:
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To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other
vehicles or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
To keep his car under reasonably safe and proper
control.
To drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable
and prudent under the circumstances, having due regard to the width, surface and condition of the highway,
the traffic thereon, the visibility, night time or day
time, condition of weather, and any actual or potential
hazards then existing."
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable
and prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or doing what such person under such circumstances would not have done. The fault may lie in acting
or in omitting to act.
You will note that the person whose conduct we
set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious
individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but a
person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While
exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general
standard of conduct."
Instruction No. 5 is identical to instruction No. 15.1
and 15.2 in Jury Instruction Forms for Utah (JIFU).
The fact that the court only gave one instruction regarding defendant's negligence would not be prejudicial
error. If the purpose of the instruction is accomplished, the
failure to give additional ones is not of controlling importance.
In Wellman vs. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701
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(1001), this court ruled that failure to instruct on unavoidable accident· was not prejudicial error. The court said that
the trial court in it& instructions fully instructed the jury
on the question of negligence and proximate cause. The court
said:
"When the error' assigned is the giving or failure
to give instructions, the real inquiry should be were the
issues . of fact
to be determined, and the
principals of law applicable thereto, correctly presented
to. the jury in a clear and understandable manner?
That is the purpose of instructions and if it is accomplished, the failure to give additional ones is not of
controlling importance." Wellman at 702. (Emphasis
added)
In
v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822
(1961), the jury returned.a verdict for the defendants in a
pedestrian .death accident. On appeal the plaintiff alleged
that certain instructions essential to their case were omitted
by the court. In affirming the jury verdict, this court stated
that:
"Certain errors are assigned with respect to instructions, but a survey thereof indicates that the
issues as to the negligence of the defendant's truck
driver and the contributory negligence of Nila were
fairly and adequately covered. It may be conceded that
request for further instructions were made which accurately state the, law and which it would not have
been error to give, but they were not necessary because
the issues were presented to the jury in a fair and
understandable manner. This is the desired objective
and it should be do'M with the least possible instructions. When it is accomplished we will not reverse
because the court refused to give other requested instructions, even though they contained accurate statements of the law which might also have been applicable
to the case." Hale at 823. (Emphasis Added)
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Since it is the desired objective to present the issues
with the least possible instructions, it would have. been
prejudicial error if the court had given instructions No. 6
and No. 8.
The court, in instruction No. 5, clearly defined the
term negligence. In instruction No. 4, the court fully covered the elements of defendant's alleged negligence: lookout,
control and reasonable and prudent speed under the circumstances. The other suggested grounds of negligence contained in plaintiff's proposed instructions No. 6 and No. 8
are argumentative and are included in the instruction on
lookout, control and speed.
Plaintiff's requested instructions No. 6 and No. 8 imposed too great a burden upon defendant Christensen. Such
an instruction would be objectionable and prejudicial to
defendants. A similar instruction was considered in the case
of Badger vs. Clayson, 18 U.2d 329, 422 P.2d 665 (1967).
In that case the plaintiff sued to recover damages resulting
from a collision between his car and the one driven by the
defendant. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of
action, whereupon the plaintiff appealed.
The appellant argued that one of the instructions given
at the trial court level put too great a burden upon his beha vior as a reasonably prudent driver. The instruction in
question required the plaintiff to "reappraise the situation
as he approaches an intersection" and "recurrently reobserve and reappraise in the light of the consistent changing
conditions." This court agreed with the plaintiff tha.t parts
of the instruction in question were impractical for him, but
nevertheless upheld the jury verdict. In so doing this court
stated:
"But the question whether reversible error was
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committed is not dependent on whether some mistake
or impropriety is demonstrated by looking at the seJ)arate part of one of the instructions as if the whole case
depended upon it. The instruction should be considered
in its entirety and along with all of the other instructions given, to determine whether they accomplish what
is essential; explaining to the jury in a manner understandable to them, the issues of facts and the law applicable thereto with reasonable accuracy, and with
fairness to both sides." (emphasis added)
The court went on to add :

"From what we have said above, it should be apparent that we believe that the instructions which were
given fulfilled the purpose we have stated elsewhere in
this opinion; and that even if there may have been
some defect in a part of one of them, when they are
all considered together, there was no error of sufficient
consequence that there is 'any reasonable likelihood
that the plaintiff did not have a fair trial and that the
result would have been different in the absence of such
error.'" Badger at 667-668. (emphasis added)
Defendants respectfully submit that the instructions
given by the court properly presented the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury in a clear and understandable
manner.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.
As indicated in Point II of defendant's brief, the trial
court in a clear and understandable manner instructed the
jury on negligence. The trial court also correctly instructed
the jury on contributory negligence by defining the term
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and then setting forth the alleged acts which, if found by
the jury, would constitute contributory negligence.
The court defined contributory negligence as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the part
of a person injured which, cooperating with the negligence of another, assists in proximately causing his
own injury.
One who is guilty of contributory negligence may
not recover from another for any injury suffered 00...
cause if both parties were at fault in negligently causing an injury the degree of negligence cannot be
weighed by the jury."

Instruction No. 6 is identical to Instruction No. 15.5 in
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah (JIFU).
In Instruction No. 12, the court stated:
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
"Before contributory negligence would preclude
plaintiff's recovery, you must find from a preponderance of the evidence that each of the two following
propositions are true:
Proposition No. 1 :
That the plaintiff was negligent in the following
particulars :
a) That he failed to keep a proper lookout.
b) That he pulled out to pass another vehicle and
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then reduced his speed without giving an adequate signal..
c) That he reduced his speed when passing another vehicle when it was unsafe to do so.
Proposition No. 2:
That the said negligence of the plaintiff, if any,
was a proximate and contributing cause of the injury.
If you find those two propositions against the
plaintiff, he cannot recover even though you found the
defendants were negligent."

Instruction No. 12 is identical in form to Instruction
No. 2.5 in Jury Instruction Forms for Utah (JIFU).
The instructions were evenly balanced between the
parties as two were given on negligence and two were given
on contributory negligence.
The trial court was required to cover the theories of

both parties in his instructions.

In Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834
(1951), plaintiff brought an action against the executor of
an estate for services rendered in giving personal care,
housekeeping, practical nursing and supplying food and
provisions to the deceased. On appeal the defendant alleged
error in failing to give certain instructions as to defendant's
theory of the case. Concerning instructions the court said:
"It Wl:!S the duty of the court to cover the theories
of both parties in his instructions * * * If the instructions are considered as a whole as they must be * * *
the court adequately discharges this duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury." Startin at 836.
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The trial court properly discharged its duty in this
case by fairly presenting the issues of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury.
POINT IV
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 WAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
Instruction No. 12 set forth the following alleged negligent acts of the plaintiff:
"a) That he failed to keep a proper lookout;
b) That he pulled out to pass another vehicle
and then reduced his speed without giving an
adequate signal;
c) That he reduced his speed when passing another vehicle when it was unsafe to do so."
There is evidence in the record to support a jury finding
that plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout. The plaintiff
testified that he saw the defendant's truck coming "real
fast" when he turned out around the Little Audrey t.ruck
(Tr. 0202). He further testified that when he got alongside
the Little Audrey truck he:

my

"* * * turned my head to him and I rolled
window down and I said 'Your brake is on fire,' and he
gave me the highball signal * * *" (Tr. 0201)

The jury could have found that when plaintiff first saw
the defendant's truck, he had a duty to keep a constant lookout for the truck as it was approaching "real fast." He
obviously didn't do this as he rolled his window down and
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yelled to the driver of the Little Audrey truck. Plaintiff's act
of turning his attention away from immident danger would
support a finding of contributory negligence.
There is also evidence in the record to support a finding
that plaintiff pulled out to pass another vehicle and then
reduced his speed without giving an adequate signal. Christensen testified that he could not recall if plaintiff signaled
or not (Tr. 0159). Even though the plaintiff testified he
did signal there was clearly a dispute in the evidence on this
matter. The plaintiff's testimony regarding his speed when
he slowed down alongside the Little Audrey truck was impeached. (Tr. 0279-0280). If the jury thought the plaintiff
testified falsely about his speed, they could have disbelieved
his testimony about signaling (Instruction No. 17). The
jury could have found that plaintiff did not signal when he
turned into the passing lane to go around the little Audrey
truck.
The record shows the plaintiff did reduce his speed
when passing another vehicle when it was unsafe to do so
(Tr. 0201). The plaintiff knew another truck was approaching from the rear, yet he remained alongside the
Little Audrey truck for a minute or two (Tr. 0166). The
jury could find plaintiff's reduction in speed when passing
the Little Audrey truck would constitute contributory negligence.
Reasonable men could conclude that one or all of the
propositions could have been a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence supports

the charge on contributory negligence.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DIRECTED THE BAILIFF TO
TAKE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS INTO THE JURY
ROOM SOON AFTER THE JURY RETIRED.
Although the exhibits were not taken to the jury room
immediately after the jury retired, the baliff took them to
the jury room before counsel had completed their exceptions to the instructions.
The record shows that by the time plaintiff's attorney
took his exceptions, the exhibits had been taken to the jury
room (Tr. 0339-0341). As soon as this oversight had been
pointed out to the trial judge, he promptly ordered the
bailiff to take the exhibits to the jury room.
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Harmless Error
No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
The jury had the exhibits during practically all of their
deliberations. They were out for two and a half to three
hours so they clearly had ample time to consider the exhibits.
This error, if any, was not prejudicial and did not in
any way affect the substantial rights of the parties.
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CONCLUSION
In Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955), this court stated:

"* * * We reaffirm our commitment that 'The right of
jury trial * * *is * * * a right so fundamental and
sacred to the citizen * * * (that it) should be jealously

guarded by the courts.' But once having been granted
such right and a verdict rendered, it should not be
regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason; nor should a judgment be disturbed
merely because of error. Only when there is error both
substantial and prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different
without it, should error be regarded as sufficient to
upset a judgment or grant a new trial."
In this case there were disputed issues of fact which
were properly submitted to the jury. The issues of negligence and contributory negligence were given to the jury in
clear, understandable language. The instructions were not
repetitious or unbalanced, but were clear, concise statements of the law as applied to the facts. The judgment of
no cause of action should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents

